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I. INTRODUCTION
Diversity initiatives in higher education, also known as affirmative action,
are nearing their nadir.' This should come as little surprise for those who have
been closely following the jurisprudence and the progression of events in this
area. Affirmative action initiatives have been under attack since their very
inception, and they now sit teetering on the brink of being declared
unconstitutional after the United States Supreme Court's decision in Fisher v.
University of Texas at Austin.2
Beginning with its 1978 decision in Regents of the University of California
3v. Bakke, the Supreme Court has gradually and consistently whittled away
higher education diversity programs, leaving them in a vulnerable and legally
precarious position.4 The Court's recent decision in Fishers marks the
culmination of its jurisprudential move away from even a reluctant endorsement
of higher education diversity programs to what will likely amount to an outright
prohibition of such programs on the *rounds that they are unconstitutional and
violate equal protection under the law.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Elon University School of Law. B.A. 1999, Indiana University-
Bloomington; M.A. 2001, Duke University; J.D. 2004, The University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill. I would like to thank my research assistant, Wade Love, for his help in researching and editing
earlier drafts of this work.
1. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013). In Fisher, the
Court required the University of Texas to present "sufficient evidence" that their application system
was narrowly tailored. Id. Additionally, the Court appeared unconvinced by the argument that
diversity is a compelling state interest that would satisfy strict scrutiny. See id. at 2419. As
discussed below, it now appears unlikely that race-conscious admissions schemes would meet this
high burden. See infra Part II.
2. 133 S. Ct. 2411.
3. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
4. See id. at 271 (affirming the judgment of a state court declaring the University of
California's special admissions program unlawful).
5. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2422.
6. See infra Part II.
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Two subtle but important problems arise with such a turn in the Court's
jurisprudence. The first problem is one of definition: the Court's definitions of
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment and equal opportunity
provided by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 have become unmoored from their
historical origins and purposes.7 While both provisions were designed to permit
individuals from historically marginalized groups (typically racial minorities)
greater opportunity for full participation in American society -thereby fostering
more successful outcomes for members of those groups-the current definitions
of these provisions more often benefit individuals who are not members of
minority groups to the detriment of the marginalized groups. Thus, ironically,
by defining the aim of these provisions to promote a "colorblind" society, 9 these
definitions have only served to further marginalize the original groups the
Fourteenth Amendment and Civil Rights Act of 1964 were intended to assist. 10
An additional problem, which will serve as the focus of this Essay, is the
practical and sociological effects such a shift away from affirmative action will
cause. In the current era of increased globalization and competition for jobs, it is
incumbent upon those seeking to enter the middle class to attain a college
education."1 A college degree has become a prerequisite for all but the most
menial jobs. Thus, any restriction on the ability of minority students to gain
access to university education and training will also limit the number of
minorities who will gain entry into middle-class American society.13 Such
7. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 398 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(noting the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act was to remedy the
effects of past discrimination).
8. See id.
9. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90 ("The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one
thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of another color.
If both are not afforded the same protection, then it is not equal.").
10. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment and
Civil Rights Act of 1964 were enacted for the benefit of minority groups); see also Eric Schnapper,
Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753,
784 (1985) (noting that the passage and consideration of race-conscious provisions-such as the
1864 and 1865 Freedmen's Bureau bills, the 1866 Freedmen's Bureau Act, the 1867 Relief
Legislation for African-Americans, as well as legislation passed by the Freedmen's Bureau between
1868 and 1870-alongside the Fourteenth Amendment, demonstrate an intent for the constitutional
provision to permit race-conscious, ameliorative measures and ensure the constitutionality of the
provisions); CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG. 1ST SESS. 2459 (1866) (statement of Rep. Stevens)
(introducing the Fourteenth Amendment in the House of Representatives and characterizing its
purpose as "the amelioration of the condition of the freedmen").
11. See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN & MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THAT USED TO BE Us: How
AMERICA FELL BEHIND IN THE WORLD IT INVENTED AND How WE CAN CoME BACK 75 (2011)
(quoting DAVID H. AUTOR & LAWRENCE F. KATZ, GRAND CHALLENGES IN THE STUDY OF
EMPLOYMENT AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE: A WHITE PAPER PREPARED FOR THE NATIONAL
SCIENCE FOUNDATION 1, available at http://www.aeaweb.org/econwhitepapers/white_papers/
David Autor.pdf (2010)) (stating that today's "labor market... greatly rewards workers with
college and graduate degrees but is unfavorable to the . .. less-educated").
12. See id.
13. See id.
504 [VOL. 65: 503
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol65/iss2/6
HOW QUICKLY WE FORGET
restrictions on minorities would create a paradoxical result: the very
constitutional and legislative tools meant to provide marginalized groups with
greater access to education-and, by extension, upward mobility-will be the
means by which these groups remain mired in a position at the bottom rungs of
the socioeconomic ladder. Furthermore, the colorblind society that the
conservative wing of the United States Supreme Court seeks to construct through
its jurisprudence in this area will produce a society that is anything but
colorblind.15  Membership in a racial minority group will, in large part, again
become a significant determinant of one's place within the larger society.
Part II of this Essay identifies the roots of the Supreme Court's
jurisprudential shift in the area of affirmative action and traces the evolution of
its philosophy on creating a colorblind society. Part III of this Essay examines
some of the actual sociological consequences of this evolution in the realm of
college admissions and extrapolates what these shifts will mean for minorities as
they attempt to enter the workforce and middle class. To conclude, this Essay
suggests a means for reaffirming affirmative action in a manner that comports
with its original aims.
II. TIE SLOW ONSET OF BLINDNESS
Since the late 1970s, the Supreme Court has been intent on slowly
dismantling affirmative action programs in higher education.16 In Bakke, the
Court took its first steps to limit affirmative action programs by concluding that,
with regard to the Equal Protection Clause, colorblindness of the law has
supplanted any need to redress past discriminatory practices or provide an
effective path of entry for minorities to elite colleges and universities.17  The
result, however, is that what was once a tool for the greater integration of the
races has become the principal means for facilitating their separation.
14. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment and
Civil Rights Act of 1964 were passed for the benefit of minority groups).
15. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 327 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("[C]laims that law must be 'color-blind' or that the datum of race is no longer relevant
to public policy must be seen as aspiration rather than as description of reality. . . . [One cannot] let
color blindness become myopia which masks the reality that many 'created equal' have been treated
within our lifetimes as inferior both by the law and by their fellow citizens.").
16. See id. at 320 (affirming the invalidity of the University of California's special
admissions program and stating that "when a State's distribution of benefits or imposition of
burdens hinges on ancestry or the color of a person's skin, that individual is entitled to a
demonstration that the challenged classification is necessary to promote a substantial state
interest"); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 336-37 (2003) (holding that universities must
"engage[] in a highly individualized" review of each applicant).
17. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320 ("But when a State's distribution of benefits or imposition of
burdens hinges on ancestry or the color of a person's skin, that individual is entitled to a
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The Bakke Court held that, although student body diversity was a
compelling state interest, such measures must be narrowly tailored and cannot
"insulat[e] each category of applicants with certain desired qualifications from
competition with all other applicants."18  However, the Court approved the
consideration of race as a "'plus' in a particular applicant's file ... 
Roughly twenty-five years after deciding Bakke, the Court further restricted
the methods by which race may be used in making admissions decisions at
institutions of higher education in Grutter v. Bollinger.20 After Grutter, schools
could no longer use "plusses" or "bonuses" on the basis of one's membership in
a racial or ethnic minority; instead, schools must engage "in a highly
individualized, holistic review of each applicant's file, giving serious
consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse
educational environment." 21 However, the Court again recognized in Grutter
that "student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify using
race in university admissions."2 2
While the majority in Grutter predicted, and hoped quite optimistically, that
such racial preferences would no longer be necessary in the twenty-five years
following its decision,23 Justice Thomas artfully interpreted the majority's
statement in his dissent as a holding that provided a twenty-five year life span for
such programs before they would become illegal.24 Thus, such race-conscious
initiatives would seemingly be up for reconsideration by the Court in twenty-five
years, and the clock was set for their ultimate demise in 2028-at which time
they would either be deemed no longer necessary or patently illegal.25
Accordingly, the Court's decision in Fisher v. Texas is all the more alarming
and telling, given that the Court had seemingly granted such race-conscious
admissions initiatives a reprieve only ten years earlier.26 A cursory reading of
Fisher illustrates how the membership of the Court has changed since its last
review of a diversity program.27 Further, the trajectory of its jurisprudence in
18. Id. at 315.
19. Id. at 317.
20. 539 U.S. 306.
21. Id. at 337.
22. Id. at 325.
23. Id. at 343 ("We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no
longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.").
24. Id. at 351 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I agree with the
Court's holding that racial discrimination in higher education admissions will be illegal in 25
years.").
25. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
26. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 (holding that universities may consider race in admissions
decisions if such use is narrowly tailored); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2422
(2013) (holding that the university has the burden under strict scrutiny to show that its admissions
process is narrowly tailored).
27. In terms of Court demographics, the composition of the Court has shifted quite
dramatically since Grutter. Gone from the Court's plurality upholding the University of Michigan
Law School's diversity initiatives are Justice O'Connor-who wrote the controlling opinion-
506 [VOL. 65: 503
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this area has shifted to such a degree that the Court may finally outlaw these
measures.28 The result in Fisher should come as no surprise, however, as it was
presaged by the Court's decisions in Grutter and Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 129-another case involving educational
diversity, but at the primary and secondary levels.30
The first clues may be found in Justice Thomas's leading dissent in Grutter,
in which he noted that while he wished "to see all students succeed whatever
their color" and was sympathetic to "those who sponsor the type of
discrimination advanced by the University of Michigan Law School," he
refrained from supporting the diversity initiative under review.31 According to
Justice Thomas, the Constitution neither "tolerate[s] institutional devotion to the
status quo in admissions policies when such devotion ripens into racial
discrimination ... [n]or does [it] countenance the unprecedented deference the
Court gives to [higher educational institutions in] an approach inconsistent with
the very concept of 'strict scrutiny."' 32 Justice Thomas also attacked the Grutter
decision as something far less than a cogent legal analysis, and merely a
response "to a faddish slogan of the cognoscenti."33
The thrust of Justice Thomas's critique-and one echoed throughout the
other dissenting opinions in Grutter3 4 -iS that "[a] close reading of the Court's
opinion reveals that all of its legal work is done through one conclusory
statement: [institutions of higher education have] a 'compelling interest in
securing the educational benefits of a diverse student body."' 3 5 Indeed, Justice
Thomas argued that the Court had made "[n]o serious effort ... to explain how
Justice Stevens, and Justice Souter. They have been replaced by Justices Alito, Kagan, and
Sotomayor, respectively. Chief Justice Rehnquist, who cast his vote with the minority in Grutter,
has been replaced by Chief Justice Roberts. Thus, Justice O'Connor's swing vote has been replaced
with a more consistently conservative vote by Justice Alito. Further, due to her former role as Dean
of Harvard Law School, Justice Kagan recused herself from Fisher. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2422.
Therefore, even a superficial analysis of the Court's composition should put any person advocating
for diversity initiatives in higher education-specifically, initiatives that take race into
consideration-on alert to the real possibility that the Court, as it stands now, is poised to severely
limit or do away with such programs in the very near future.
28. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2421. Although the Court did not explicitly forbid the use of
race-conscious admissions systems in higher education with its ruling in Fisher, it is clear that the
Court's requirement-that "sufficient evidence" must be presented to show a narrowly tailored
admissions system-is a standard that, in the current Court's eyes, may be impossible to meet. Id.
29. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
30. Id. at 710-11.
31. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 350 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
32. Id.
33. Id. Further, Justice Thomas concluded quite forcefully that diversity itself "is more a
fashionable catchphrase than it is a useful term, especially when something as serious as racial
discrimination is at issue." Id. at 354 n.3. Therefore, the institutional interest in diversity,
according to Justice Thomas, is merely "aesthetic" and differs little from other choices, such as "the
shape of the desks and tables in its classrooms," that these institutions might make. Id
34. See generally id. at 346-95 (citations omitted).
35. Id. at 356.
2013] 507
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these benefits [of diversity) fit with the state interests the Court has recognized
or rejected as compelling."
Ensnarled within the web of his own logic, Justice Thomas also insisted that
"there is no pressing public necessity in maintaining a public law school at all
and, it follows, certainly not an elite law school. Likewise, marginal
improvements in legal education [on the basis of a diverse student body] do not
qualify as a compelling state interest." 37  Justice Thomas identified only two
broad circumstances in which the state would have a compelling interest in using
race-conscious criteria.38  First, a state would have a compelling interest in
remedying past discrimination for which the government itself is responsible.39
In the eyes of Justice Thomas, the second category-which appears quite
cataclysmic-would include "measures the State must take to provide a bulwark
against anarchy, or to prevent violence." 40
What is most troubling about Fisher-but predictable given the Court's
demographics-is that what once stood as a dissenting opinion expressing
skepticism as to whether diversity could be considered a compelling state
interest in Grutter now stands as a concurring opinion in Fisher.41 Thus, a
majority of the Court is now unconvinced that diversity is a compelling state
interest that would satisfy constitutional review under strict scrutiny.42 After
Fisher, it seems unlikely that any diversity scheme taking race into account
would pass muster under the Court's current interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause as colorblind, under which all distinctions on the basis of
race-whether ameliorative or pernicious-would be outlawed.43 It appears that
the only thing preventing the Court from making this pronouncement is the fact
36. Id. In his own dissent, Justice Kennedy was equally critical of the Court's credulity,
describing the majority's review as "nothing short of perfunctory [in its acceptance of] the
University of Michigan Law School's assurances that its admissions process meets with
constitutional requirements." Id at 388-89 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 357 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
38. Id. at 351 ("A majority of the Court has validated only two circumstances where
'pressing public necessity' or a 'compelling state interest' can possibly justify racial discrimination
by state actors.").
39. Id. at 351-52 (citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 504 (1989)).
40. Id. at 353.
41. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2422-33 (2013) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (reiterating his opinion in Grutter).
42. Id. at 2419 (noting that although Grutter deferred to "a university's 'educational
judgment that ... diversity is essential to its educational mission,"' complete judicial deference was
inappropriate, and the courts "should ensure that there is a reasoned, principled explanation for the
academic decision." (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328)).
43. See id at 2428-29 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas explained the colorblind
theory of the Equal Protection Clause in his concurrence in Fisher:
The Constitution does not pander to faddish theories about whether race mixing is in the
public interest. The Equal Protection Clause strips States of all authority to use race as a
factor in providing education. All applicants must be treated equally under the law, and
no benefit in the eye of the beholder can justify racial discrimination.
Id
508 [VOL. 65: 503
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that "the parties [did] not ask the Court to revisit that aspect of Grutter's
holding." Nevertheless, while the colorblind approach was relegated to the
minority in Grutter, it gained ascendancy in Fisher.45 Although the approach
has yet to achieve its fullest expression in the context of university admissions,
the template for what is to come may be seen in the Court's Parents Involved
decision.
In Parents Involved, the minority opinion in Grutter became the plurality
opinion-due to Justice O'Connor's swing vote being replaced by Justice Alito's
vote-and sought to engrave the colorblind interpretation of the constitution into
law.46 Parents Involved was a consolidated challenge to the race-conscious
student assignment plans of Louisville, Kentucky, and Seattle, Washington.47 In
each school district, students were assigned to schools in a manner that helped to
ensure a predetermined, ideal racial balance for each school.48
It was perhaps unsurprising that the Court invalidated each of these racial
balancing plans, given that each school district sought to achieve such a balance
through numerically predetermined percentages of white and non-white
children.49 And while both the University of Michigan Law School and the
University of Texas have been careful to avoid assigning numerical guidelines
for their race-conscious admissions policies,50 Parents Involved sends a subtle,
yet threatening message that even their attempts at achieving a "critical mass"
may be in jeopardy.
Referring to Grutter directly, the Court charted its likely path forward in one
sentence.52 After describing the split nature of the Grutter decision, Chief
44. Id. at 2419.
45. While Justice Thomas originally espoused the colorblind approach in a dissenting
opinion in Grutter, he more recently discussed it in a concurring opinion in Fisher. See Fisher, 133
S. Ct. at 2422-32 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349-80
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
46. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007)
("The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of
race."); see also id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (chastising the minority for "[d]isfavoring a colorblind
interpretation of the Constitution").
47. See id. at 709-11, 715 (majority opinion).
48. Id. at 710.
49. See id. at 729-30 (noting that the Court has "many times over reaffirmed that '[r]acial
balance is not to be achieved for its own sake"' (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494
(1992))); see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) ("Preferring
members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its
own sake. This the Constitution forbids.").
50. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S.Ct. 2411, 2415-17 (2013) (citations omitted)
(describing the University of Texas's admissions criteria and process); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 312-16 (2003) (citations omitted) (describing Michigan Law School's admissions criteria
and process).
51. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 747-48 (noting that the best way to formulate an
admissions policy that does not take into account a student's race is to "stop assigning students on a
racial basis" (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955))).
52. See id. at 729.
2013] 509
7
Parrish: How Quickly We Forget: The Short and Undistinguished Career of Af
Published by Scholar Commons, 2013
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Justice Roberts concluded that the Court's previous approval of a policy that
"work[s] backward to achieve a particular type of racial balance, rather than
working forward from some demonstration of the level of diversity that provides
the purported benefits, is a fatal flaw under our existing precedent." 53 In that
seemingly prosaic statement, the Chief Justice not only identified the flaw
endemic to the University of Michigan Law School admissions policy and those
modeled upon it, but also made it implicit that the Court-with its newly
constituted conservative majority-would correct this purported flaw once given
54the opportunity to do so.
That single sentence written by Chief Justice Roberts likely marks the end of
Grutter and the race-conscious admissions paradigm.s And now, with the
Court's ominous invitation in Fisher to challenge whether there is a compelling
state interest in achieving diversity at the higher educational level,56 the
floodgates appear to have finally opened for the Court to continue implementing
its colorblind interpretation of the Constitution.5 7 The progression to Fisher has
58been clear, and it provides little doubt of the character of its likely progeny.
Having espoused their colorblind constitutional thesis as a minority position in
Grutter, and now as the posture of the majority, the conservative members of the
Court will be able to claim a complete victory in much less time than they first
predicted.59
Thus, in the wake of the Court's decision in Fisher, it appears
incontrovertible that race-conscious admissions will at least be curtailed
significantly-but more likely outlawed altogether.60 And with that, it seems
that the day Justice Brennan warned about will come to pass when
"colorblindness [has] become [a] myopia which masks the reality that many
'created equal' have been treated within our lifetimes as inferior both by the law
and by their fellow citizens."61 It is this reality of which Justice Brennan spoke
that we will wrestle with as a society for generations to come. Two important
questions are therefore relevant here: What will be the practical effects of this
myopic insistence on colorblindness? And what can be done to revive
affirmative action as an effective tool for social advancement? The remainder of
53. Id. (emphasis added).
54. See supra note 50.
55. Id.
56. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
57. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418 (2013) (noting that the state has a
compelling interest in obtaining student body diversity, but only if "[t]he particular admissions
process used for this objective is subject to judicial review").
58. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
59. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 (predicting that the use of race in the admissions process
will no longer be necessary in 25 years).
60. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2421 (noting that the lower court "confined the strict scrutiny
inquiry in too narrow a way" and holding that "sufficient evidence" is required to prove that an
admissions process is narrowly tailored and meets the requirements of strict scrutiny).
61. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 327 (Brennan J., dissenting).
510 [VOL. 65: 503
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this Essay will explore the first question and will close with a suggestion to
address the second.
III. THE VIEW FROM THE COLORBLIND SOCIETY
As noted above, should the Supreme Court decide to place further
restrictions on the use of race in university admissions or to fully outlaw such
affirmative action programs, the repercussions will likely be far-reaching and
immediate. The aforementioned conclusion is derived from two previous
instances-one in Texas itself, the other in California-in which affirmative
action was outlawed and, as a result, the respective states immediately saw a
significant decrease in minority applications and enrollment.
In Texas, the decrease in minority applications and enrollment was
precipitated by the Fifth Circuit's decision in Hopwood v. Texas,62 in which the
court held that "any consideration of race or ethnicity by the [University of
Texas] law school for the purpose of achieving a diverse student body is not a
compelling interest under the Fourteenth Amendment." 63  The effect of the
64
Hopwood decision was immediate. In the span of just one year after Hopwood
was announced, the number of African-American and Hispanic applicants
dropped by nearly a quarter, while the total number of applicants decreased by
only 13%.65 The court noted that "[c]ompared to 1995, African-American
enrollment for 1997 dropped almost 40% (from 309 to 190 entering freshmen)
while Hispanic enrollment decreased by 5% (from 935 to 892 entering
freshmen)."66 By contrast, during that same time period, "Caucasian enrollment
increased by 14%."67
To combat this decrease in minority enrollment, the Texas state legislature
introduced the Top Ten Percent Law in 1997.68 The Top Ten Percent Law is a
race-neutral provision that grants all high school seniors graduating within the
top ten percent of their class automatic admission into the state's colleges and
62. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
63. Id. at 944.
64. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 223-24 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated by
133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (citing Office of Admissions, Diversity Levels of Undergraduate Classes at
the University of Texas at Austin, THE UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN 1996-2002, at 6 (2003),
http://www.utexas.edu/student/admissions/research/ClassroomDiversity96-03.pdf; Office of
Institutional Studies, Enrollment by Semester and Gender, THE UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN 1989-
1999, http://www.utexas.edu/academic/ima/sites/default/files/SHB98-99Students.pdf).
65. Id at 224 (citing Office of Admissions, Diversity Levels of Undergraduate Classes at the
University of Texas at Austin, THE UNIv. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN 1996-2002, at 6 (2003)).
66. Id. (citing Office of Institutional Studies, Enrollment by Semester and Gender, THE
UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN 1989-1999, http://www.utexas.edu/academic/ima/sites/default/files/
SHB98-99Students.pdf).
67. Id. (citing Office of Institutional Studies, Enrollment by Semester and Gender, THE
UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN 1989-1999, http://www.utexas.edu/academic/ima/sites/default/files/
SHB98-99Students.pdf).
68. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (West 1997).
2013] 511
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universities.69 The measure has indeed been successful in improving minority
representation within the University of Texas system, increasing "African-
American enrollment ... [at the University of Texas at Austin] from 2.7% to
3.0% and Hispanic enrollment ... from 12.6% to 13.2%" in the year following
its enactment.
Further, the enactment of a race-conscious admissions policy patterned after
the one approved in Grutter has only served to augment the minority presence on
the campuses of the University of Texas system. In upholding the University
of Texas admissions policy in Fisher, the Fifth Circuit noted that "[i]n an
entering class that was roughly the same size in 1998 as it was in 2008, the
enrollment of African-American students doubled from 165 students to 335
students."72 Additionally, it is helpful to compare these numbers with the
minority enrollment figures for 2004-the last year before the University of
Texas introduced its race-conscious admissions policy-to determine the effects
of the policy.73 In 2004, the university's "fall enrollment included only 275
African-Americans,",74 an increase of approximately 22%.
The numbers from Texas demonstrate that removing race as a consideration
in university admissions has a significant negative impact on minority
enrollment at institutions of higher education. Specifically, when race may not
be considered, African-American matriculation decreases precipitously. 76
Additionally, it becomes clear from the numbers above that, while race-neutral
strategies targeted at increasing minority participation in higher education can
have some beneficial effect,7 the most effective means of achieving a more
diverse student body is to take into consideration the racial or ethnic
backgrounds of applicants.
Similarly, California has experienced a dramatic shift in minority enrollment
in its public institutions of higher education following a ban on the consideration
of race in admissions decisions. The shift in minority enrollment was brought
about by California Proposition 209, adopted in 1996, which prohibits the state
from "discriminat[ing] against, or grant[ing] preferential treatment to, any
69. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 224.
70. Id. at 224.
71. See id. (noting that this policy "has produced noticeable results").
72. Id. at 226.
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
79. See David Card & Alan B. Krueger, Would the Elimination of Affirmative Action Affect
Highly Qualified Minority Applicants? Evidence from Cahfornia and Texas, 58 INDuS. & LAB. REL.
REv. 416, 420 (2005).
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individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in
the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting."80
In the year preceding the adoption of Proposition 209, the three flagship
University of California campuses-Los Angeles (UCLA), San Diego, and
Berkeley (UC Berkeley)-all admitted minorities at a rate greater than 50%.81
This figure is significant given the fact that both UCLA and UC Berkeley
admitted less than 50% of their applicants that year.82
Nonetheless, "[t]he halting of affirmative action had an immediate impact on
minority admissions at the University of California." 83 A significant drop in the
admission rates of black applicants promptly followed the introduction of
Proposition 209.84 Between 1995 and 1997, the "[a]dmission rates of black
applicants at the three most selective campuses fell [by] 45[-]55% . .. 5." That
figure began to improve slightly in the period between 1998 and 2001, during
which African-American admissions were only down 20-25% from their pre-
Proposition 209 levels.86
What becomes evident from even the most cursory survey of the above
statistics is that any change in the current law will result in some diminution in
the presence of minorities on college campuses. This result is merely
compounded when race-based criteria are outlawed altogether. When
universities are not permitted to use race as a criteria in making admissions
decisions, the number of minority aplicants-and, consequently, those
admitted-decreases at a significant rate. In this way, colorblindness has a
very real and negative impact on racial minorities: it merely produces increased
hegemony for those already in the majority. 90 Most distressing is that, as the
path to college and university education for minorities narrows, so too will their
opportunities to attain the type of employment that will lead to membership in
the middle class. 91
In the twentieth century, "education was a choice not a necessity-[one
could] choose to be educated or not, but either way [one could] get a decent job
80. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31.
81. Card & Krueger, supra note 79, at 418 tbl.1 (showing that UCLA, UC San Diego, and
UC Berkeley admitted 52.1%, 52.6%, and 53.6% of their minority applicants, respectively).
82. Id. (showing that UCLA, UC San Diego, and UC Berkeley admitted 43.1%, 59.5%, and
39.9% of all applicants, respectively).
83. Id. at 420.
84. See id. at 420-21.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 421.
87. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 62-67, 83-85 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 62-67, 83-85 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN & MANDELBAUM, supra note 11, at 101-02 (2011) (citations
omitted) (discussing middle class wages and the difficulty in attaining these wages without
education beyond a high school degree).
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and live a decent life." 92 However, in the twenty-first century, "education is not
an option" and "is [indeed] a necessity for a middle-class standard of living."9 3
The correlation between education and earning potential cannot be ignored.
Individuals who complete post-secondary education have increasingly outpaced
the earning potential of those with only a high school degree or less.94 To wit,
"[t]he hourly wage of the typical college graduate in the U.S. was approximately
1.5 times the hourly wage of the typical high school graduate in 1979."95 By
comparison, in "2009, this ratio stood at 1.95."96
Beyond wages, the level of one's education has a direct bearing on how
likely it is for one to become unemployed during times of economic distress.97
According to a Brookings Institute study released in November 2010, "during
the Great Recession [of 2009,] employment dropped much less steeply among
college-educated workers than other workers." 98 In fact, in the two-year period
between 2007 and 2009, "[t]he employment-to-population ratio dropped by more
than 2 percentage points . .. for working-age adults without a bachelor's degree,
but fell by only half a percentage point for college-educated individuals." 99
Thus, it has become clear that we now live in "a labor market that greatly
rewards workers with college and graduate degrees but is unfavorable to the
particularly less-educated . . . .""o
As demonstrated above, education and employment are inextricably linked,
and competition for access to the former will mirror competition for the latter.
As more jobs require college degrees, the premium for post-secondary education
will only increase. Labor statistics support this point. 101
In 1977, Justice Marshall lamented:
92. Id. at 101 (quoting Andreas Schleicher, Senior Education Officer, Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development).
93. Id.
94. See id.
95. Id. (quoting DAVID H. AUTOR & LAWRENCE F. KATz, GRAND CHALLENGES IN THE
STUDY OF EMPLOYMENT AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE: A WHITE PAPER PREPARED FOR THE
NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION 1 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at
http://www.aeaweb.org/econwhitepapers/white_papers/David Autor.pdf).
96. Id.
97. See id. at 101-02 (citing Alan Berube, Degrees of Separation: Education, Employment,
and the Great Recession in Metropolitan America, BROOKINGS INST. 1 (2010), http://www.brookings.
edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/11/05%20metro%20america%20education%20be
rube/1105 metro america education berube.pdf).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 102 (quoting Alan Berube, Degrees ofSeparation: Education, Employment, and the
Great Recession in Metropolitan America, BROOKINGS INST. 1 (2010), http://www.brookings.
edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/11/05/o20metroo20america/o2Oeducation/o20berube/1 105
metro america education berube.pdf).
100. Id. at 75 (quoting DAVID H. AUTOR & LAWRENCE F. KATZ, GRAND CHALLENGES IN THE
STUDY OF EMPLOYMENT AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE: A WHITE PAPER PREPARED FOR THE
NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION 1 (2010), available at http://www.aeaweb.org/econwhitepapers/
whitejpapers/David Autor.pdf).
101. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
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When the Negro child reaches working age, he finds that America offers
him significantly less than it offers his white counterpart. For Negro
adults, the unemployment rate is twice that of whites, and the
unemployment rate for Negro teenagers is nearly three times that of
white teenagers. A Negro male who completes four years of college can
expect a median annual income of merely $110 more than a white male
who has only a high school diploma. Although Negroes represent
11.5% of the population, they are only 1.2% of the lawyers and judges,
2% of the physicians, 2.3% of the dentists, 1.1% of the engineers and
2.6% of the college and university professors. 102
According to Justice Marshall, "the relationship between those figures and
the history of unequal treatment afforded to the Negro cannot be denied." 103
The numbers cited by Justice Marshall have only improved marginally over
the last thirty years.104 In fact, "[w]hile about 12 percent of the nation's
working-age population is black, [only] about 5 percent of physicians and
dentists in the United States are black-a share that has not grown since
1990 ... .,105 This holds true for black architects as well, who comprise "3
percent of American architects," a figure that "has not increased in more than
two decades."106
The numbers comparing the educational attainment and employment
measures of African-Americans to whites are no more encouraging.107  The
percentage of African-Americans attaining college degrees lags far behind that
102. See Univ. of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 395-96 (1978) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS 170 tbl.44 (1978); U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS SERIES P-60, No. 105, p. 198 tbl.47 (1977); U.S.
DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 25 tbl.24 (1977); id. at
407-08)).
103. Id. at 396.
104. See generally Nelson D. Schwartz & Michael Cooper, Affirmative Action Ruling Near,
Blacks' Progress Remains Slow, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2013, at Al (discussing the lack of




107. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, EDUC. AND Soc. STRATIFICATION BRANCH, PERCENT OF
PEOPLE 25 YEARS AND OVER WHO HAVE COMPLETED HIGH SCHOOL OR COLLEGE, BY RACE,
HISPANIC ORIGIN AND SEX: SELECTED YEARS 1940 To 2012, at A-2 (2012), available at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/2012/tables.html (showing 31.3% of
whites completed four years of college or more in 2012, compared to 21.2% of blacks in 2012); see
also U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS FROM THE
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY: SELECTED YEARS 1977 To 2013 (2013) (showing an
unemployment rate of 13.8% for blacks in 2012, compared to an unemployment rate of 7.2% of
whites in the same year).
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of white Americans.1os In 1978, the year the Supreme Court decided Bakke,
20.7% of white males twenty-five years of age or older had completed four or
more years of college, while the percentage for black males stood at 7.3%.109
Although these percentages have improved in the last thirty years, the wide
margin between the educational attainment of African-Americans and white
Americans persists. 110 For instance, in 1999, 32% of white males between the
ages of twenty-five to twenty-nine had obtained a bachelor's degree or higher,
whereas only 13.1% of African-American males in this age range reached this
level of educational attainment.II
Educational attainment numbers, however, only tell half of the story. When
these numbers are coupled with the respective unemployment rates for each
group, it becomes clear how closely related educational attainment is to one's
ability to find gainful employment and, perhaps, enter the middle class.
Nevertheless, what may be gleaned from the data is that the African-American
unemployment rates for nearly every year since 1977 have been double the rates
for white Americans.112 Further, while the 2011 unemployment rates for
African-American males with only a high school degree and those with a college
degree were 16.9% and 7.9%, respectively, the unemployment rates for white
males were 8.9% and 4.0% in the same categories; thus, it is clear that one's race
and educational attainment has a direct bearing on whether one can obtain, and
then retain, gainful employment.113 These numbers also demonstrate that a need
for some form of assistance at the higher educational level is still vitally
necessary to provide African-Americans an equal opportunity to compete for
jobs in the changing economy.
For these reasons, the ever intensifying competition for jobs on the basis of
educational attainment, coupled with the Court's abandonment of effective
affirmative action for minorities, will likely have far-reaching consequences for
108. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, EDUC. AND Soc. STRATIFICATION BRANCH, TABLE A-2,
PERCENT OF PEOPLE 25 YEARS AND OVER WHO HAVE COMPLETED HIGH SCHOOL OR COLLEGE,
BY RACE, HISPANIC ORIGIN AND SEX: SELECTED YEARS 1940 To 2012, at A-2 (2012), available at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/2012/tables.html (displaying the
percentages of whites and blacks completing four or more years of college from 1940 to 2012).
109. Id. (displaying the percentages of whites and blacks completing four or more years of
college in 1978).
110. See id.
111. See id. at A-4.
112. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS
FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY: SELECTED YEARS 1977 To 2013 (2013), available at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/historical/. For instance, while the annual
unemployment rate for African-Americans in 1978 was 12.8%, the annual rate of unemployment for
whites was merely 5.2%. Id. When the recession of 2009 hit, the African-American unemployment
rate spiked up to 16.0% in 2010, while the white unemployment rate hit a ceiling of 8.7% in 2011.
Id.
113. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE
CHARACTERISTICS BY RACE AND ETHNICITY 14-15 tbl.6 (2013), available at http://www.bls.gov/
cps/cpsrace201 1.pdf.
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minority groups.114 The irony, however, is that at the historical moment when
these types of assistance programs seem to be the most necessary to allow
minority group members to compete effectively within the current labor market,
they are being dismantled by the federal judiciary under the rationale that they
have outlived their usefulness.115
Nevertheless, the matriculation statistics from the University of Texas and
University of California systems make it clear that affirmative action programs
are not only crucial to maintaining access to university education for minority
students, but also serve as a bulwark against majority hegemony at these
institutions.116 Further, at this historical moment, these programs must be
available to afford minorities an opportunity to compete in the contemporary
global labor market and avoid the concomitant minority underrepresentation
within the professional workforce and the middle class. 18
IV. MOVING TOWARDS A REMEDY
This Essay previously intimated that the path to reclaiming and revitalizing
affirmative action is one of interpretation.1 19 The Court's current conservative
majority favors a colorblind reading of both the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the equal opportunity mandate of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, in the hopes of creating a more equalized society.120
However, the colorblind interpretation is myopic for the prescient reasons
Justice Brennan provided nearly forty years ago that remain true to this day.121
Reading these provisions in the colorblind fashion-which the contemporary
majority insists upon-does not recognize the plain reality of American
society. 122 Both historically, and in the present, minority groups have strugled
to close the socioeconomic gap between themselves and white Americans. A
114. See supra notes 55-59, 83-92 and accompanying text.
115. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (viewing skeptically the idea that diversity is a compelling state interest).
116. See supra notes 62-67, 83-85 and accompanying text.
117. See supra 91-100 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Schwartz & Cooper, supra note 104, at A1O ("While about 12 percent of the
nation's working-age population is black, about 5 percent of physicians and dentists in the United
States are black. . . .").
119. See supra Part II.
120. See, e.g., Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2428-29 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The Equal Protection
Clause strips States of all authority to use race as a factor in providing education.").
121. See Univ. of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 327 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
122. See, e.g., Schwartz & Cooper, supra note 104, at A10 (highlighting the discrepancy
between the total African-American population and the percentage of African-Americans in
professional jobs such as doctors and architects).
123. See supra notes 105-13 and accompanying text.
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colorblind reading of these provisions merely serves to widen this gap and close
a vital door to minority inclusion in the university and professional ranks. 124
Additionally, the colorblind approach is out of step with the logic and
history behind the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.125 When one takes even a cursory appraisal of the historical
impetus for the passage of each provision, it seems clear that both provisions
were intended to increase the opportunities for minorities to participate as equals
within American society.126 The irony is that the very provisions meant to assist
minority groups in their efforts to ascend the socioeconomic ladder are now the
very tools being used to impede that progress.127 What is even more ironic is the
fact that this result "pervert[s] the intent of the Framers [of the Fourteenth
Amendment] by substituting abstract equality for the genuine equality the
Amendment was intended to achieve." 128
The solution is to return to the original intent of these laws and abandon the
aspirational notion of colorblindness until that aspiration is indeed an American
reality.129 It is time to remind the Court that the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment and Civil Rights Act of 1964 was not to maintain the status quo, but
to actually lay the foundation and framework for a society in which equal
protection under the law and equal opportunity actually exist in a real way for
the groups for whom these rights had previously been denied.130 This can be
accomplished through direct challenge by forcing the Court to confront this
historical purpose, as well as the contemporary need for an interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that permits race to be
considered for ameliorative purposes. When the current Court begins to engage
with historical and contemporary reality-rather than the world as it wishes it
were-we may once again, as a nation, begin to move forward and beyond our
difficult racial past.
124. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
125. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 363 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(discussing the Supreme Court's findings in previous cases supporting congressional legislation
designed to overcome discrimination's effects).
126. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 398 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing Ry. Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 94 (1945)) (noting that the intent of these provisions
was to remedy past discrimination).
127. See id.; Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (citing Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (viewing skeptically the idea that diversity is a compelling state
interest).
128. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 398 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
129. See supra notes 119-28 and accompanying text.
130. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 398 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting
the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act was to remedy the effects of
past discrimination).
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